A Logical Theory of Nonmonotonic Inference and Belief Change

by Alexander Bochman

Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg in Berlin, Heidelberg

Written in English
Cover of: A Logical Theory of Nonmonotonic Inference and Belief Change | Alexander Bochman
Published: Pages: 435 Downloads: 208
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Subjects:

  • Computer science,
  • Artificial intelligence

About the Edition

This monograph provides logical foundations and a uniform description for nonmonotonic reasoning and belief change. The approach to both these subjects is based on a powerful notion of an epistemic state that subsumes both existing models for nonmonotonic inference and current models for belief change. Many results and constructions in the book are completely new and have not appeared earlier in the literature. The book is primarily intended for experts in Artificial Intelligence and Knowledge Representation who are interested in tools for describing commonsense reasoning tasks as well as in representation capabilities of such tools. It is also of interest to general logicians.

Edition Notes

Statementby Alexander Bochman
SeriesArtificial Intelligence, Artificial Intelligence
Classifications
LC ClassificationsQ334-342, TJ210.2-211.495
The Physical Object
Format[electronic resource] /
Pagination1 online resource (xii, 435 p.)
Number of Pages435
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL27071602M
ISBN 103642075169, 3662045605
ISBN 109783642075162, 9783662045602
OCLC/WorldCa851372102

1. Logical acuity as a necessary factor in rationality. The concept of rationality is highly complex, and often involves distinct constructs based on principles borrowed from physics, social science, psychology, evolution, economy, political studies, philosophy, etc. Adopting a belief, drawing inferences from it, constructing a value system, and acting based on beliefs and desires, can all be. Argumentation theory, or argumentation, is the interdisciplinary study of how conclusions can be reached through logical reasoning; that is, claims based, soundly or not, on includes the arts and sciences of civil debate, dialogue, conversation, and studies rules of inference, logic, and procedural rules in both artificial and real world settings. the belief machine reasons nonmonotonically from those premises, then the inference rule is nonmonotonic as well (and therefore is not sound). In this paper, we present a different form of simulative inference that is sound for a class of belief machines that includes some that perform defeasible inference. The reasons determining that a legal theory is "erroneous" are not more certain than the contested theory itself. A strict and formal logical analysis cannot give us the full grasp of legal rationality. A weaker logical theory, allowing for nonmonotonic steps, comes closer, at the expense of an inevitable loss of computational efficiency.

Cn((A-" ~¢) U {¢}), that is, the "revision" of a fixed background theory A by the premise ¢. The theory A here is supposed to consist of the agent's defaults or expectations rather than his beliefs. 4. Belief Change and Nonmonotonic Reasoning as Problems of Rational Choice Find many great new & used options and get the best deals for Belief, Evidence, and Uncertainty Problems of Epistemic Inference SpringerBriefs at the best online prices at Seller Rating: % positive. Inference Change The Book Theory Literature Foundation Ebay Models Products eBay #Sponsored A Logical Theory of Nonmonotonic Inference and Belief Change Alexander Boc Sonstige Sonstige. Ge Sbs - $ Ge Sbs Logical V5a Vme Processor Card Vme-v5a Rev

  An inference is a conclusion reached on the basis of evidence and reasoning. One must correctly apprehend the facts of a given situation, appreciate their significance in relation to earlier discovered facts, determine how these new and old data p.

A Logical Theory of Nonmonotonic Inference and Belief Change by Alexander Bochman Download PDF EPUB FB2

"This text provides a broad overview of topics related to non-classical consequence operators, nonmonotonic inference A Logical Theory of Nonmonotonic Inference and Belief Change book belief change.

The presentation is abstract and precise, and is grounded in a formal setting of logic." (Miroslav Truszezynski, Mathematical Reviews, Issue b)Cited by: This is the first book that integrates nonmonotonic reasoning and belief change into a single framework from an artificial intelligence logic point-of-view.

The approach to both these subjects is based on a powerful notion of an epistemic state that subsumes both existing models for nonmonotonic inference and current models for belief cturer: Springer. The main subject and objective of this book are logical foundations of non­ monotonic reasoning.

This bears a presumption that there is such a thing as a general theory of non monotonic reasoning, as opposed to a bunch of systems for such a reasoning existing in the : Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

This is the first book that integrates nonmonotonic reasoning and belief change into a single framework from an artificial intelligence logic point-of-view. The approach to both these subjects is based on a powerful notion of an epistemic state that subsumes both existing models for nonmonotonic inference and current models for belief : Alexander Bochman.

theory of belief change to understand some of traditional epistemology’s key notions, including justification and defeasibility. Rott’sprogram,then, is an attempt to unify traditional and formal epistemology by providing a fundamentally new, decision-theoretic foundation for belief change within which to study key epistemic notions and relations.

The book shows that reasoning processes - the drawing on inferences and changing one's beliefs - can be viewed as belonging to the realm of practical reason by embedding logical theories into the broader context of the theory of rational : Hans Rott.

Makinson and P. Gärdenfors. Relations between the logic of theory change and nonmonotonic logic. In Proceedings Workshop The Logic of Theory Change, Konstanz, Germany,pagesBerlin Heidelberg New York, Springer. Google Scholar Digital Library; R. Moore. Autoepistemic logic.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the close relations between the logic of theory change (alias belief revision) on the one hand, and nonmonotonic logic on the other.

Non-monotonic Reasoning and the Reversibility of Belief Change Daniel Hunter E. Highway Santa Ynez, CA 2 BELIEF CHANGE AND INFERENCE A monotonic inference relation is one for which the criticized the theory of belief change just presented on the grounds that it cannot account for iterated belief change.

To handle iterated. Presumably, such inferences are not generated by explicit logical reasoning, but logical methods can be used to describe and analyze such inferences.

Part 1 gives a purely system-theoretic explication of belief and inference. Part 2 adds a reliabilist theory of justification for inference, with a qualitative notion of reliability being employed. A Logical Theory of Nonmonotonic Inference and Belief Change.

Alexander Bochman - - Springer. Hannes Leitgeb, Inference on the Low Level: An Investigation Into Deduction, Nonmonotonic Reasoning, and the Philosophy of Cognition. Change, Choice and Inference develops logical theories that are necessary both for the understanding of adaptable human reasoning and for the design of intelligent systems.

The book shows that reasoning processes - the drawing on inferences and changing one's beliefs - can be viewed as belonging to the realm of practical reason by embedding logical theories into the broader context of the theory of.

This is the first book that integrates nonmonotonic reasoning and belief change into a single framework from an artificial intelligence logic point-of-view.

The approach to both these subjects is based on a powerful notion of an epistemic state that subsumes both existing models for nonmonotonic inference and current models for belief change. As has been said, in the general correspondence between nonmonotonic inference and belief change, contraction inference corresponds to the basic operation of belief contraction.

This augments the idea that belief change and nonmonotonic inference are “two sides of the same coin” and extends it to belief contractions. Get this from a library. A Logical Theory of Nonmonotonic Inference and Belief Change. [Alexander Bochman] -- This monograph provides logical foundations and a uniform description for nonmonotonic reasoning and belief change.

The approach to both these subjects is. knygynai Vilniuje ir Kaune jau veikia. Išsirinkite vietoje arba nemokamai atsiimkite užsakymą. A Logical Theory of Nonmonotonic Inference and Belief Change between nonmonotonic inference and belief change, contraction inference corresponds to the basic operation of belief.

We provide a conceptual description of the field of nonmonotonic reasoning as comprising two essentially different theories, preferential and explanatory nonmonotonic reasoning. The relationship between the two constitutes the main theoretical problem of nonmonotonic reasoning, and its solution should hopefully provide an impetus for the future development of the field.

The way of thinking in partially known circumstances suggested by nonmonotonic reasoning consists in using justified beliefs and reasonable assumptions that can guide us in our decisions.

Accordingly, nonmonotonic reasoning can be described as a theory of making and revising assumptions in a reasoned or principled way [Doyle, ]. Of course. Nonmonotonic Reasoning: Logical Foundations of Commonsense Gerhard Brewka GMD, Sankt Augustin, Germany The right of the University 0/ Cambridge to print and self.

The book shows that reasoning processes - the drawing on inferences and changing one's beliefs - can be viewed as belonging to the realm of practical reason by embedding logical theories into the broader context of the theory of rational choice. The book unifies lively and significant strands of.

A logical theory of nonmonotonic inference and belief change - numerical methods. SpringerISBNpp. I-XII, A foundationalist view of the AGM theory of belief change.

Artif. Intell. (): () [j10] view. Alexander Bochman: Belief Contraction as Nonmonotonic Inference. Symb. Log. 65 (2. — 5 — Such assistance from the logic of belief change is itself only to be expected, especially in view of the close connections, noted in Makinson and Gärdenfors (), between properties that may hold of belief revision operators, and those that may hold of nonmonotonic inference relations.

Towards a Logical Theory of Practical Reasoning Richmond H. Thomason As in the nonmonotonic theory of pure belief, to ing, however, this is complicated by Dutch book arguments that seem to require a quantitative approach to both beliefs and desires in.

Concepts of Theoretical Rationality: Postulates for Belief Change and Nonmonotonic Reasoning; 5. Foundational Belief Change Using Nonmonotonic Inference; 6. A General Concept of Practical Rationality: Constraints for Coherent Choice; 7.

Coherentist Belief Change as a. This volume contains revised and extended versions of the papers presented at the Second International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning, held in Grassau (FRG), JuneThe workshop brought together researchers with different backgrounds, including non-monotonic logic, logic programming, truth maintenance and philosophy.

Their papers contain substantial advances to the logical. For in truth-estimation as in so much of life we have to rest content with doing the best one can actually manage to achieve in the circumstances. Default Reasoning BIBLIOGRAPHY [Bochman, ] A.

Bochman. A Logical Theory of Nonmonotonic Inference and Belief Change. Berlin: Springer Verlag. [Harper, ] W. Harper. 1 Introduction. A range of formal models of human reasoning have been proposed in a number of fields such as philosophy, logic, artificial intelligence, computer science, psychology, cognitive science, etc.: various logics (epistemic logics; non‐monotonic logics), probabilistic systems (most notably, but not exclusively, Bayesian probability theory), belief revision systems, neural networks.

Belief revi-sion, abstract nonmonotonic inference relations, reasoning with conditionals, semantics of logic programs with negation, and applications of nonmonotonic formalisms as database query languages and specification languages for search prob lems all provided motivation and new directions for research in nonmonotonic reasoning.

Abstract We consider the connections between belief revision, conditional logic and nonmonotonic reasoning, using as a foundation the approach to the-ory change developed by Alchourron, G´ ardenfors and Makinson (the AGM ap-¨ proach).

This is first generalized to allow the iteration of theory change. Inferences are steps in reasoning, moving from premises to logical consequences; etymologically, the word infer means to "carry forward".

Inference is theoretically traditionally divided into deduction and induction, a distinction that in Europe dates at least to Aristotle (s BCE).

Deduction is inference deriving logical conclusions from premises known or assumed to be true, with the laws.tonic inference relations in the literature hold in it. We prove that this nonmonotonic inference frame is strictly correspendent with multiple belief revision operation.

On the basis of this result we analyse a specific paradigm of defult theory which satisfies all the rules under con­ sideration and discuss limitations of .A non-monotonic logic is a formal logic whose consequence relation is not other words, non-monotonic logics are devised to capture and represent defeasible inferences (cf.

defeasible reasoning), i.e., a kind of inference in which reasoners draw tentative conclusions, enabling reasoners to retract their conclusion(s) based on further evidence.